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Game theory formalizes certain interactions between physical particles or between living beings in
biology, sociology, and economics, and quantifies the outcomes by payoffs. The prisoner’s dilemma
(PD) describes situations in which it is profitable if everybody cooperates rather than defects (free-
rides or cheats), but as cooperation is risky and defection is tempting, the expected outcome is de-
fection. Nevertheless, some biological and social mechanisms can support cooperation by effectively
transforming the payoffs. Here, we study the related phase transitions, which can be of first order
(discontinous) or of second order (continuous), implying a variety of different routes to cooperation.
After classifying the transitions into cases of equilibrium displacement, equilibrium selection, and
equilibrium creation, we show that a transition to cooperation may take place even if the stationary
states and the eigenvalues of the replicator equation for the PD stay unchanged. Our example is
based on adaptive group pressure, which makes the payoffs dependent on the endogeneous dynamics
in the population. The resulting bistability can invert the expected outcome in favor of cooperation.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le,87.23.Ge,87.23.Kg,89.65.-s
Introduction. Game theory goes back to von Neumann
[1], one of the superminds of quantum mechanics. Origi-
nally intended to describe interactions in economics, soci-
ology, and biology [1–3], it has recently become a quickly
growing research area in physics, where methods from
non-linear dynamics and pattern formation [4, 5], agent-
based or particle-like models [5, 6], network theory [7]
and statistical physics [8] are applied. There are even
quantum theoretical contributions [9].
When two entities characterized by the states, “strate-
gies”, or “behaviors” i and j interact with each other,
game theory formalizes the result by payoffs Pij , and the
structure of the payoff matrix (Pij) determines the kind
of the game. The dynamics of a system of such entities
is often delineated by the so-called replicator equations
dp(i, t)
dt
= p(i, t)
[∑
j
Pijp(j, t)−
∑
j,l
p(l, t)Pljp(j, t)
]
(1)
[3]. p(i, t) represents the relative frequency of behav-
ior i in the system, which increases when the expected
“success” Fi =
∑
j Pijp(j, t) exceeds the average one,∑
i Fip(i, t).
Many collective phenomena in physics such as agglom-
eration or segregation phenomena can be studied in a
game-theoretical way [5, 6]. Applications also include the
theory of evolution [10] and the study of ecosystems [11].
Another exciting research field is the study of mecha-
nisms supporting the cooperation between selfish indi-
viduals [1–3] in situations like the “prisoner’s dilemma”
or public goods game, where they would usually defect
(free-ride or cheat). Contributing to public goods and
sharing them constitute ubiquitous situations, where co-
operation is crucial, for example, in order to maintain a
sustainable use of natural resources or a well-functioning
health or social security system.
In the following, we will give an overview of the sta-
tionary solutions of the replicator equations (1) and their
stability properties. Based on this, we will discuss sev-
eral “routes to cooperation”, which transform the pris-
oner’s dilemma into other games via different sequences
of continuous or discontinuous phase transitions. These
routes will then be connected to different biological or
social mechanisms accomplishing such phase transitions
[12]. Finally, we will introduce the concept of “equilib-
rium creation” and distinguish it from routes to coop-
eration based on “equilibrium selection” or “equilibrium
displacement”. A new cooperation-promoting mechanism
based on adaptive group pressure will exemplify it.
Stability properties of different games. Studying games
with two strategies i only, the replicator equations (1)
simplify, and we remain with
dp(t)
dt
= p(t)[1− p(t)]
{
λ1[1− p(t)]− λ2 p(t)
}
, (2)
where p(t) = p(1, t) represents the fraction of cooperators
and 1 − p(t) = p(2, t) the fraction of defectors. λ1 =
P12 − P22 and λ2 = P21 − P11 are the eigenvalues of
the two stationary solutions p = p1 = 0 and p = p2 =
1. If 0 < λ1/(λ1 + λ2) < 1, there is a third stationary
solution p = p3 = λ1/(λ1 + λ2) with eigenvalue λ3 =
−(1 − p3)λ1. For the sake of our discussion, we imagine
an additional fluctuation term ξ(t) on the right-hand-side
of Eq. (2), reflecting small perturbations of the strategy
distribution.
Four different cases can be classified [3]: (1) If λ1 < 0
and λ2 > 0, the stationary solution p1 corresponding
to defection by everybody is stable, while the stationary
solution p2 corresponding to cooperation by everyone is
unstable. That is, any small perturbation will drive the
system away from full cooperation towards full defection.
This situation applies to the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) de-
fined by payoffs with P21 > P11 > P22 > P12. According
to this, strategy i = 1 (“cooperation”) is risky, as it can
2yield the lowest payoff P12, while strategy i = 2 (“de-
fection”) is tempting, since it can give the highest payoff
P21. (2) If λ1 > 0 and λ2 < 0, the stationary solution p1 is
unstable, while p2 is stable. This means that the system
will end up with cooperation by everybody. Such a situ-
ation occurs for the so-called harmony game (HG) with
P11 > P21 > P12 > P22, as mutual cooperation gives the
highest payoff P11. (3) If λ1 > 0 and λ2 > 0, the station-
ary solutions p1 and p2 are unstable, but there exists a
third stationary solution p3, which turns out to be stable.
As a consequence, the system is driven towards a situ-
ation, where a fraction p3 of cooperators is expected to
coexist with a fraction (1− p3) of defectors. Such a situ-
ation occurs for the snowdrift game (SD) (also known as
hawk-dove or chicken game). This game is characterized
by P21 > P11 > P12 > P22 and assumes that unilateral
defection is tempting, as it yields the highest payoff P21,
but also risky, as mutual defection gives the lowest payoff
P22. (4) If λ1 < 0 and λ2 < 0, the stationary solutions p1
and p2 are both stable, while the stationary solution p3 is
unstable. As a consequence, full cooperation is possible,
but not guaranteed. In fact, the final state of the system
depends on the initial condition p(0) (the “history”): If
p(0) < p3, the system is expected to end up in the station-
ary solution p1, i.e. with full defection. If p(0) > p3, the
system is expected to move towards p2 = 1, correspond-
ing to cooperation by everybody. The history-dependence
implies that the system is multistable (here: bistable), as
it has several (locally) stable solutions. This case is found
for the stag hunt game (SH) (also called assurance). This
game is characterized by P11 > P21 > P22 > P12, i.e.
cooperation is rewarding, as it gives the highest payoff
P11 in case of mutual cooperation, but it is also risky, as
it yields the lowest payoff P12, if the interaction partner
is uncooperative.
Phase transitions and routes to cooperation. When fac-
ing a prisoner’s dilemma, it is of vital interest to trans-
form the payoffs in such a way that cooperation be-
tween individuals is supported. Starting with the pay-
offs P 0ij of a prisoner’s dilemma, one can reach differ-
ent payoffs Pij , for example, by introducing strategy-
dependent taxes Tij = P
0
ij − Pij > 0. When increas-
ing the taxes Tij from 0 to T
0
ij, the eigenvalues will
change from λ01 = P
0
12 − P
0
22 and λ
0
2 = P
0
21 − P
0
11 to
λ1 = λ
0
1+T22−T12 and λ2 = λ
0
2+T11−T21. In this way,
one can create a variety of routes to cooperation, which
are characterized by different kinds of phase transitions.
We define route 1 [PD→HG] by a direct transition from
a prisoner’s dilemma to a harmony game. It is charac-
terized by a discontinuous transition from a system, in
which defection by everybody is stable, to a system, in
which cooperation by everybody is stable (see Fig. 1a).
Route 2 [PD→SH] is defined by a direct transition from
the prisoner’s dilemma to a stag hunt game. After the
moment t∗, where λ2 changes from positive to negative
values, the system behavior becomes history-dependent:
When the fluctuations ξ(t) for t > t∗ exceed the crit-
ical threshold p3(t) = λ1/[λ1 + λ2(t)], the system will
experience a sudden transition to cooperation by every-
body. Otherwise one will find defection by everyone, as
in the prisoner’s dilemma (see Fig. 1b). In order to make
sure that the perturbations ξ(t) will eventually exceed
p3(t) and trigger cooperation, the value of λ2 must be
reduced to sufficiently large negative values. It is also
possible to have a continuous rather than sudden tran-
sition to cooperation: We define route 3 [PD→SD] by
a transition from a prisoner’s dilemma to a snowdrift
game. As λ1 is changed from negative to positive val-
ues, a fraction p3(t) = λ1(t)/[λ1(t) + λ2] of coopera-
tors is expected to result (see Fig. 1c). When increas-
ing λ1, this fraction rises continuously. One may also
implement more complicated transitions. Route 4, for ex-
ample, establishes the transition sequence PD→SD→HG
(see Fig. 1d), while we define route 5 by the transition
PD→SH→HG (see Fig. 1e). One may also implement
the transition PD→SD→HG→SH (route 6, see Fig. 1f),
establishing a path-dependence, which can guarantee co-
operation by everybody in the end. (When using route 2,
the system remains in a defective state, if the perturba-
tions do not exceed the critical value p3.)
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FIG. 1: Schematic illustration of the phase transitions defin-
ing the different routes to cooperation. The order parameter
is the stationary frequency of cooperators, while the control
parameters are the parameters r, w, k, m, or q in Nowak?s
cooperation-enhancing rules [12] (see main text) or, more gen-
erally, (non-)linear combination of the model parameters b
and c. Solid (red) lines represent stable stationary proportions
of cooperators, dashed lines unstable fix points. Diagonal lines
show the additional stationary solution p3, where 0 ≤ p3 ≤ 1.
(p = proportion of cooperators; DEFECT = defection is sta-
ble, i.e. everybody defects; COOP = cooperation is stable, i.e.
everybody cooperates; COEX = mixture of defectors with a
proportion p3 of cooperators; BISTAB = cooperation is sta-
ble if p3 < p(0), where p(0) means the initial proportion of
cooperators, otherwise everybody defects.)
Relationship with cooperation-supporting mechanisms.
We will now discuss the relationship of the above intro-
duced routes to cooperation with biological and social
3mechanisms (“rules”) promoting the evolution of coop-
eration. Martin A. Nowak performs his analysis of five
such rules with the reasonable specifications T = b > 0,
R = b − c > 0, S = −c < 0, and P = 0 in the limit of
weak selection [12]. Cooperation is assumed to require a
contribution c > 0 and to produce a benefit b > c for the
interaction partner, while defection generates no payoff
(P = 0). As most mechanisms leave λ1 or λ = (λ1+λ2)/2
unchanged, we will now focus on the payoff-dependent
parameters λ1 and λ (rather than λ1 and λ2). The ba-
sic prisoner’s dilemma is characterized by λ01 = −c and
λ0 = 0.
According to the Supporting Online Material of Ref.
[12], kin selection (genetic relatedness) tranforms the
payoffs into P11 = P
0
11 + r(b − c), P12 = P
0
12 + br,
P21 = P
0
21 − cr, and P22 = P
0
22. Therefore, it leaves λ
unchanged and increases λ1 by T22 − T12 = br, where r
represents the degree of genetic relatedness. Direct reci-
procity (repeated interaction) does not change λ1, but
it reduces λ by − 1
2
(b − c)[1/(1 − w) − 1] < 0, where w
is the probability of a future interaction. Network reci-
procity (clustering of individuals playing the same strat-
egy) leaves λ unchanged and increases λ1 by H(k), where
H(k) is a function of the number k of neighbors. Finally,
group selection (competition between different popula-
tions) increases λ1 by (b − c)(m − 1), where m is the
number of groups, while λ is not modified. However, λ1
and λmay also change simultaneously. For example, indi-
rect reciprocity (based on trust and reputation) increases
λ1 by cq and reduces λ by −
1
2
(b− c)q < 0, where q quan-
tifies social acquaintanceship.
Summarizing this, kin selection, network reciprocity,
and group selection preserve λ = 0 and increase the value
of λ1 (see route 1 in Fig. 2). Direct reciprocity, in con-
trast, preserves the value of λ1 and reduces λ (see route
2a in Fig. 2). Indirect reciprocity promotes the same tran-
sition (see route 2b in Fig. 2). Supplementary, one can
analyze costly punishment. Using the payoff specifications
made in the Supporting Information of Ref. [14], costly
punishment changes λ by −(β + γ)/2 < 0 and λ1 by
−γ [14], i.e. when γ is increased, the values of λ and λ1
are simultaneously reduced (see route 2c in Fig. 2). Here,
γ > 0 represents the punishment cost invested by a co-
operator to impose a punishmet fine β > 0 on a defector,
which decreases the payoffs of both interaction partners.
Route 3 can be generated by the formation of friendship
networks [13]. Route 4 may occur by kin selection, net-
work reciprocity, or group selection, when starting with
a prisoner’s dilemma with λ0 < 0 (rather than λ0 = 0
as assumed before). Route 5 may be generated by the
same mechanisms, if λ0 > 0. Finally, route 6 can be im-
plemented by time-dependent taxation (see Fig. 2).
Further kinds of transitions to cooperation. The routes
to cooperation discussed so far change the eigenvalues λ1
and λ2, and leave the stationary solutions p1 and p2 un-
changed. However, transitions to cooperation can also be
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FIG. 2: Phase diagram of expected system behaviors, based on
an analysis of the game-dynamical replicator equation (2) as
a function of the parameters λ and λ1. The different routes to
cooperation are illustrated by arrows. Terms in capital letters
are defined in Fig. 1. Inset: Stable stationary solutions (solid
lines) and unstable ones (broken lines) as functions of the
parameter K, when the reward depends on the proportion of
cooperators. The bifurcation at the “tipping point” K = K0
“inverts” the system behavior (see main text).
generated by shifting the stationary solutions or creating
new ones, as we will show now. For this, we generalize the
replicator equation (2) by replacing λ1 with f(p) and λ
with g(p), and by adding a term h(p), which can describe
effects of spontaneous transitions like mutations. To guar-
antee 0 ≤ p(t) ≤ 1, we must have h(p) = v(p) − pw(p)
with functions w(p) ≥ v(p) ≥ 0. The resulting equa-
tion is dp/dt = F (p(t)) with F
(
p
)
= (1 − p)[f(p) −
2g(p)p]p+ h(p), and its stationary solutions pk are given
by F (pk) = (1−pk)[f(pk)−2g(pk)pk]pk+h(pk) = 0. The
associated eigenvalues λk = dF (pk)/dp determining the
stability of the stationary solutions pk are
λk = (1−2pk)(fk−2pkgk)+pk(1−pk)(f
′
k−2pkg
′
k−2gk)+h
′
k,
where we have used the abbreviations fk = f(pk), gk =
g(pk), hk = h(pk). f
′
k = f
′(pk), g
′
k = g
′(pk) and hk =
h′(pk) are the derivatives of the functions f(p), g(p) and
h(p) in the points p = pk.
Classification. We can now distinguish different kinds
of transitions from defection to cooperation: If the sta-
tionary solutions p1 = 0 and p2 = 1 of the prisoner’s
dilemma are modified, we talk about transitions to coop-
eration by equilibrium displacement. This case occurs, for
example, when random mutations are not weak (h 6= 0).
If the eigenvalues λ1 or λ2 of the stationary solutions
p1 = 0 and p2 = 1 are changed, we speak of equilib-
rium selection. This case applies to all routes to coop-
eration discussed before. If a new stationary solution
appears, we speak of equilibrium creation. The differ-
ent cases often appear in combination with each other
(see the Summary below). In the following, we will dis-
4cuss an interesting case, where cooperation occurs solely
through equilibrium creation, i.e. the stationary solutions
p1 and p2 of the replicator equation for the prisoner’s
dilemma as well as their eigenvalues λ1 and λ2 remain un-
changed. We illustrate this by the example of an adaptive
kind of group pressure that rewards mutual cooperation
(T11 < 0) or sanctions unilateral defection (T21 > 0).
Both, rewarding and sanctioning reduces the value of
λ2, while λ1 remains unchanged. Assuming here that the
group pressure vanishes, when everybody cooperates (as
it is not needed then), while it is maximum when every-
body defects (to encourage cooperation) [15], we may set
f(p) = λ01 and g(p) = λ
0 − K[1 − p(t)], corresponding
to λ2(t) = λ
0
2 − 2K[1 − p(t)]. It is obvious that we still
have the two stationary solutions p1 = 0 and p2 = 1 with
the eigenvalues λ1 = λ
0
1 < 0 and λ2 = 2λ
0 − λ01 > 0 of
the original prisoners dilemma with parameters λ01 and
λ02 or λ
0. However, for large enough values of K [namely
for K > K0 = λ
0+ |λ01|+
√
|λ01|(2λ
0 + |λ01|)], we find two
additional stationary solutions
p± =
1
2
− λ
0
2K
±
√(
1
2
− λ
0
2K
)2
−
|λ0
1
|
2K
. (3)
p− is an unstable stationary solution with p1 < p− < p+
and λ− = dF (p−)/dp > 0, while p+ is a stable stationary
solution with p− < p+ < p2 and λ+ = dF (p+)/dp < 0
(see inset of Fig. 2). Hence, the assumed dependence of
the payoffs on the proportion p of cooperators generates
a bistable situation (BISTAB), with the possibility of a
coexistence of a few defectors with a large proportion
p+ of cooperators, given K > K0. If p(0) < p−, where
p(0) denotes the initial condition, defection by everybody
results, while a stationary proportion p+ of cooperators
is established for p− < p(0) < 1. Surprisingly, in the
limit K → ∞, cooperation is established for any initial
condition p(0) 6= 0 (or through fluctuations).
Summary. We have discussed from a physical point of
view what must happen that social or biological, payoff-
changing interaction mechanisms can create cooperation
in the prisoner’s dilemma. The possible ways are (i) mov-
ing the stable stationary solution away from pure de-
fection (routes 3, 4, and 6), (ii) stabilizing the unstable
solution (routes 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6), or (iii) creating new
stationary solutions, which are stable (routes 3, 4 and 6).
Several of these points can be combined. If (i) is fulfilled,
we speak of “equilibrium displacement”, if their eigenval-
ues change, we called this “equilbrium selection”, and if
(iii) is the case, we talk of “equilibrium creation”. The
first case can result from mutations, the second one ap-
plies to many social or biological cooperation-enhancing
mechanisms [12]. We have discussed an interesting case of
equilibrium creation, in which the outcome of the replica-
tor equation is changed, although the stationary solutions
of the PD and their eigenvalues remain unchanged. This
can, for example, occur by adaptive group pressure [15],
which introduces an adaptive feedback mechanism and
thereby increases the order of non-linearity of the repli-
cator equation. Surprisingly, already a linear dependence
of the payoff values Pij on the endogeneous dynamics
p(t) of the system is enough to destabilize defection and
stabilize cooperation, thereby inverting the outcome of
the prisoner’s dilemma.
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